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RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Parole Release-Federal Circuits Conflict on
Applicability of Due Process and Administrative
Procedure Act to Parole Release Decisions
I. INTRODUCTION
The power to parole prisoners derives from the legislative power
to define crimes and set penalties for offenses, and has been dele-
gated by Congress and state legislatures to the federal and state
parole boards.' Recent litigation of inmates' post-conviction rights
in federal and state correctional systems has focused increasingly 2
on the broad discretionary power that parole boards exercise by
performing their statutory mandate. 3 While prisoners have con-
tended that due process under the fifth4 and fourteenth5 amend-
ments, in addition to the federal and state administrative procedure
acts,' entitle them to procedural safeguards in parole board proceed-
ings,7 courts traditionally have rejected such contentions under the
theory that release on parole is a "privilege," not a vested prisoner
"right," and is not subject to judicial review,' or because parole
boards are not subject to administrative procedure statutes because
of their unique functions.' In Hyser v. Reed, 10 the District of Colum-
1. 33 LA. L. REv. 708 (1973).
2. Loewenstein, Accelerating Change in Correctional Law: The Impact of Morrissey, 7
CLEARINGHOUSE Rav. 528, 535 (1974).
3. Kastenmeier & Eglit, Parole Release Decision-Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise,
and the Demise of Mythology, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 477, 481-83 (1973).
4. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "No person
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
5. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "No
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6. See notes 11 and 33 infra.
7. Prisoners typically seek recognition of procedural rights such as a right to a written
statement of reasons for parole denial or revocation, the right to confrontation and cross-
examination, the right to counsel, the right to compel attendance of witnesses, the right of
discovery of adverse information in government files, and the right to a decision by an
impartial tribunal. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
8. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
9. See note 31 infra and accompanying text.
10. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Thompson v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
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bia Circuit Court held that proceedings of the United States Board
of Parole were not subject to the adjudicatory provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)," reasoning that the Board
does not "adjudicate," because it shares a nonadversary interest
with the prisoner in his rehabilitation, and because the Board is not
required by statute to adjudicate after a hearing, a specific requisite
for APA applicability. Subsequently, in Menechino v. Oswald,'2 the
Second Circuit found that no due process rights attach to parole
release proceedings, following the Hyser analysis that parole pro-
ceedings are nonadversary, and holding that an inmate has no pres-
ently enjoyed right to which due process can attach. The recent
development of a flexible concept of due process,' 3 however, has
permitted a finer balancing of governmental and individual inter-
ests than the prior requirement of a "full panoply" of procedural
safeguards, or none at all, and has tolled the demise of the "right-
privilege" constitutional law doctrine. In Morrissey v. Brewer," the
Supreme Court held that parolees were entitled to limited proce-
dural due process rights in United States Board of Parole proceed-
ings to revoke parole. The Court rejected the concept that parole is
a privilege, and stressed that both the government and the inmate
have substantial interests in avoiding the "grievous loss" inflicted
by premature parole termination. Lower courts recently have con-
fronted the issue whether due process, under the Morrissey ration-
ale, requires a statement of reasons for denial of parole. Although
the Fifth Circuit, in Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole,5
refused to recognize that due process attaches to parole release pro-
ceedings because an inmate has no right endangered by the proceed-
ings, but only a possibility of conditional freedom, the Second Cir-
cuit, in United States, ex rel. Johnson v. New York Board of
Parole," has held that Morrissey requires that a state Board of
Parole provide an inmate with a written statement of reasons for
denial of his parole application. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit, in
King v. United States,'7 has held that section 555(e)'" of the APA
requires the United States Board of Parole provide similar state-
11. Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
12. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
13. See notes 48-52 infra and accompanying text.
14. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
15. 468 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1972) reo'd, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), cert.
granted, vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
16. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
17. 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
18. See note 32 infra.
[Vol. 271258
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ments to federal prisoners. This Comment will analyze the status
of due process and statutory rights in federal parole release hearings
in light of these post-Morrissey decisions and suggest a rationale
that may allow more consistent results in adjudication of future
questions of due process rights in parole release proceedings.
II. EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD PAROLE RELEASE
PROCEEDINGS
A. Application of Administrative Procedure Act to Parole
Proceedings
The APA applies to each "agency," meaning "each authority
of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within
• . . another agency. . . ."' The United States Board of Parole is
by statute a part of the Department of Justice,2" with authority to
release eligible federal prisoners on parole. 2' Despite the congres-
sional intent to maximize the coverage of the APA,2 2 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held in a 1949 decision, Hiatt v. Compagna,23 that the adjudica-
tion and judicial review portions of the Act were not applicable to
the Board's parole revocation proceedings, observing that "[t]he
full dress procedure [the APA] requires would render it practically
impossible for the Board to handle its business. ' 24 The Hiatt court's
initial premise was that parole was a matter of legislative grace, not
a prisoner right; apparently accepting the Board's contention that
the parole system was sui generis among federal administrative pro-
cesses, the court then reasoned that because it was a privilege parole
release could properly be committed by statute to the nonreviewa-
ble discretion of the Board of Parole.25 While the Hiatt holding was
limited to parole revocation proceedings, the court discussed the
APA in broad structural terms, 26 and later decisions have cited
19. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(a), 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1970).
21. 18 U.S.C. § § 4203(a), 4208 (1970). The Board of Parole has promulgated regulations
pursuant to the statute that control the procedures for parole release and administration. 28
C.F.R. § 2 (1974); 39 Fed. Reg. 20029, 23261 (1974).
22. "The definition of agency in . . . the bill is perfectly simple . . . . [T]here is
included any authority regardless of its form or organization. . . . In short, whoever has the
authority to act with respect to the matters later defined is an agency." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 354 (1946). See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
23. 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950).
24. Id. at 45. The court stated that the APA "has never been thought applicable by the
Board or the Attorney General who appoints its members and approves its rules. The full
dress procedure it requires would render it practically impossible for the Board to handle its
business." Id. at 44-45.
25. See note 21 supra.
26. See note 24 supra.
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Hiatt without further analysis for the position that the APA does
not apply to the proceedings of the Board of Parole." In the leading
case of Hyser v. Reed,5 however, Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger
in 1963 articulated a more precise rationale for the inapplicability
of the adjudication section of the Act to parole revocation proceed-
ings. Noting that section 554 of the Act, entitled "Adjudications,"',
applies only to cases "required by statute to be determined on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing," the Hyser majority
found that the Board was exempt from the section because no stat-
ute required the Board to adjudicate on a record after an agency
hearing. The court further reasoned that the Board did not "adjudi-
cate" because the Board and the prisoners subject to it had an
identity of interest in efficient prisoner rehabilitation that rendered
parole proceedings essentially nonadversary in character." Al-
though commentators 3' subsequently have pointed out that other
sections of the APA, particularly section 555(e) ,32 requiring a state-
ment of reasons for denial of written applications to an agency, may
apply to the Board,33 Hyser and Hiatt remain unchallenged author-
ity that the Board is not subject to the adjudication and judicial
review sections of the Act.34 In 1972, however, the federal Adminis-
trative Conference3 adopted a resolution calling upon the Board to
give reasons for denial of parole applications.36 The Board subse-
27. Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332, 334 (3rd Cir. 1960); Moore v. Reid, 142 F. Supp.
481, 483 (D.D.C. 1956). But see Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
28. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
29. Administrative Procedure Act § 5, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
30. 318 F.2d 225, 237, 258. The Hyser court's finding that the Board is different from
other agencies because it is not an adversary to its subject prisoners would seem comparable
to the contention that the Fifth Circuit apparently accepted in Hiatt that the Board is sui
generis among agencies, although more persuasively articulated. Compare Hyser v. Reed, 318
F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1963) with Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir. 1948).
31. Professor Davis has been the most outspoken critic of the Board and has commented
at length on the thesis that the Board may be operating in violation of the APA. See, e.g.,
K. DAVIs, DISCREIONARY JUSTME: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 126-33 (1969); Johnson, Federal
Parole Procedures, 25 AD. L. REv. 459, 479-80 (1973).
32. Section 555(e) of the APA provides as follows: "Prompt notice shall be given of the
denial in whole or in part of a written application ...of an interested person made in
connection with any agency proceeding. Except in affirming a prior denial or when the denial
is self-explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for
denial." Administrative Procedure Act § 6(d), 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970). Federal parole pro-
ceedings are initiated by a written application from a prisoner. 39 Fed. Reg. 20029 (1974).
33. Two state decisions have held that the principle of administrative fairness, indepen-
dent of statutory provisions, requires a statement of reasons for denial of parole. In re Sturm,
15 CRIM. L. REP. 2159 (Cal. 1974); Monks v. New Jersey Bd. of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d
193 (1971).
34. See Johnson, supra note 31, at 479-80.
35. 25 AD. L. REv. 531 (1973) (resolution adopted June 7, 1972).
36. Id. at 534.
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quently initiated a limited pilot program of stating such reasons,
and more recently has promulgated new regulations providing for a
statement of reasons together with more precise standards for evalu-
ation of parole applications.31
B. Application of Due Process Requirements to Parole Proceedings
Because parole release derives from the legislative power to
define crimes and set penalties for offenses," courts until recently
viewed parole as a "privilege," an entitlement dependent upon leg-
islative grace, rather than a "right,"39 and rebuffed prisoner chal-
lenges to any aspect of the parole decision process," reasoning that
the parole release question is committed to the unreviewable discre-
tion of the Board of Parole.4' Thus, the "doctrine of rights and
privileges" provided a rationale for judicial abdication of any role
in parole administration, and precluded the applicability of any due
process safeguards to parole proceedings.12 By contrast, the Su-
preme Court in a series of cases beginning with Hannah v. Larche3
recognized that governmental proceedings could jeopardize a vari-
ety of private interests,44 and that varying combinations of due pro-
cess safeguards may be appropriate to protect those interests,45 de-
37. 39 Fed. Reg. 20029, 23261 (1974).
38. See note 1 supra.
39. The doctrine that parole or probation is a matter of grace may be traced to Car-
dozo's dictum that any probation or suspension of a criminal sentence comes as an "act of
grace." Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935). Despite the rejection of the doctrine by the
Supreme Court, it still appears in isolated opinions. Compare Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 374 (1971), with Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 468 F.2d 31, 39 (5th Cir.
1972) (dissenting opinion). The Supreme Court has specifically discarded the doctrine that
parole is a matter of grace or privilege. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
40. See, e.g., Losieau v. Hunter, 193 F.2d 41 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (denial of parole after two-
minute interview not a reviewable abuse of discretion).
41. See, e.g., Juelich v. United States Bd. of Parole, 437 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1971);
Thompkins v. United States Bd. of Parole, 427 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Frederick, 405 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1968); Brest v. Ciccone, 371 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1967). Contra,
Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (prisoner may obtain judicial review of alleged
violation of constitutional rights by Board action in declaratory judgment proceeding).
42. See generally Loewenstein, supra note 2, at 533. The doctrine that parole was a
privilege was also part of the judicial rationale for refusing to hold that the Board of Parole
was subject to APA. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
43. 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See note 44 infra.
44. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (some due process necessary in state
proceeding to revoke driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits
cannot be terminated without notice and hearing); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961) (government employee cannot be fired without minimum of due process).
45. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (six separate due process ele-
ments necessary in parole revocation proceedings); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(ten due process safeguards required in welfare termination proceeding).
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pending upon the character of the proceeding and the urgency of the
governmental need for summary adjudication. In applying this new
mode of due process analysis, which eventually spelled the end of
the right-privilege doctrine, the Court developed a three-step analy-
sis" by which the courts initially could ascertain the governmental
interest furthered by the challenged proceedings, then identify the
potential loss a private party might suffer because of an adverse
decision in the proceeding, and finally, select the elements of due
process appropriate to the proceeding by balancing the magnitude
of the potential private loss against the extent of the government's
interest in summary adjudication. Because the flexibility of the new
concept has allowed courts to tailor the applicability of due process
safeguards to the character and gravity of the proceeding, it has
permitted a finer balancing of governmental and individual inter-
ests.47 The new concept of due process thus furnishes an alternative
to the traditional due process mandate of a "full panoply" of trial-
type procedural safeguards, or none at all, and has eliminated the
right-privilege distinction as an element of constitutional law."
In the leading case of Menechino v. Oswald,"° decided in 1970,
the Second Circuit eschewed the terms of the right-privilege doc-
trine but applied it in substance5' to hold that no due process rights
attached to parole release proceedings. First, the court reasoned
that due process rights were required only in governmental proceed-
ings that threatened an existing private interest; the court followed
Hyser2 in concluding that parole proceedings were nonadversary in
character, and therefore not an appropriate setting for due process
protections, because of the identity of Board and prisoner interests
in rehabilitation. Secondly, the Menechino court observed that even
46. See Parsons-Lewis, Due Process in Parole-Release Decisions, 60 CALIMF. L REv. 1518,
1547 (1972).
47. See cases cited note 45 supra.
48. The phrase "full panoply" has become a term of art in current due process analysis
for the traditional array of trial-type procedural safeguards that are associated with criminal
prosecutions, including but not limited to notice and hearing, right to counsel, right to
disclosure of adverse evidence, right to confrontation and cross-examination, and right to a
decision by an impartial tribunal. The term was first used in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420, 442 (1960). See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); United States ex
rel. Johnson v. New York Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
49. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
374 (1971); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.16-.17 (1958). See generally Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 1439 (1968).
50. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
51. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.
1974); note 53 infra.
52. 430 F.2d at 407.
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if parole proceedings were adversary in nature, a prisoner had no
right that was vulnerable in the proceeding, reasoning that only
presently enjoyed rights should be accorded due process protection,
and a prisoner seeking parole has no such right, but merely an
"expectation" of freedom on parole. 53 By employing the flexible due
process concept, however, the Supreme Court has held that the
interests of convicts must be accorded due process protection at
points both before and after the parole release interview-post-
conviction sentencing, 4 prison disciplinary proceedings, 5  and pa-
role revocation. 6 In Morrissey v. Brewer,5" a landmark 1972 decision,
the Court held that summary revocation procedures grievously af-
fected a parolee's interest in retaining the conditional freedom of
parole, causing significant loss to the inmate and damage to the
government's economic 8 and societal59 interests in rehabilitating
him, and that some procedural due process therefore was required
in the revocation proceeding. Chief Justice Burger's majority opin-
ion noted at the outset that parole release had become an integral
53. One analysis of Menechino has characterized the distinction between rights that are
presently enjoyed and rights that are merely "expectations" as "essentially the right-privilege
distinction in not-too-deceptive disguise." Comment, The Parole Process, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
282, 363 (1971). The Second Circuit apparently agreed with this critique in the 1974 decision
in United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), in
which the majority described a due process distinction based on whether a right is "presently
enjoyed" as "nothing more than a reincarnation of the right-privilege dichotomy in not-too-
deceptive disguise."
54. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to appointed counsel at post-conviction
sentencing or probation revocation).
55. Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974) (some due process rights attach to prison
disciplinary proceedings).
56. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (minimal due process required in parole
revocation proceeding); see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (Morrissey holding may
additionally require counsel at parole revocation proceeding).
57. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
58. Releasing prisoners on parole is economical for the government, since the cost of
supervising a parolee is much less than that of maintaining a prisoner. In 1967 the cost
differential between parole and imprisonment in the federal correctional system was more
than $1,500.00 annually per prisoner. PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTIncE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 194 (1967). Judge Celebrezze
has suggested that the cost of imprisonment is so much greater than that of the parole system
that the expense of additional judicially imposed procedural requirements will not lessen the
government's economic motivation to parole as many prisoners as possible. Rose v. Haskins,
388 F.2d 91, 102 & n.16 (6th Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
59. A number of commentators have singled out parole procedures and administration
as major causes for prisoner anxiety and frustration, because of the lack of consistency in
administration and the absence of standards for release. At a minimum these conditions
would seem to work against rehabilitation by denying a prisoner an opportunity to identify
the objectionable aspects of his record and to work to improve them. See, e.g., Kastenmeier
& Eglit, supra note 3, at 487; Rogge, An Overview of Administrative Due Process, 19 VILL.
L. REv. 197, 198 (1973); Parsons-Lewis, supra note 47, at 1527.
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part of the modern theory of rehabilitative penology, serving to
"help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individu-
als as soon as they are able."6 Rejecting the right-privilege distinc-
tion as irrelevant to due process analysis, the Court first observed
that the touchstone for procedural protections was whether an indi-
vidual was condemned by a governmental proceeding to suffer
"grievous loss." The Court then found that the conditional liberty
of the parolee was substantially analogous to unqualified freedom,
and that the termination of parole inflicted "grievous loss" upon the
parolee. The Court concluded that society,6" in addition to the pris-
oner, had an interest in avoiding erroneous revocation, and that a
balancing of these interests required that the revocation hearing
should be structured with due process safeguards that would allow
it to remain informal, while assuring an accurate picture of the facts
to the tribunal.2
III. THE IMPACT OF MORRISSEY ON PAROLE RELEASE PROCEEDINGS
A. The Applicability of the APA-King v. United States
In King v. United States, 3 a 1974 decision, the Seventh Circuit
held that the Board of Parole was required to give a written state-
ment of reasons for denial of parole because a parole release inter-
view is an "agency proceeding" governed by section 555(e) of the
APA.6 4 In King, plaintiff prisoner brought a declaratory judgment
action against the Board of Parole and other governmental authori-
ties,"5 contending that the Board's refusal to state reasons for denial
60. 408 U.S. at 477.
61. Notes 59 & 60 supra; 408 U.S. at 484.
62. 408 U.S. at 489. The Court specified 6 procedural safeguards as the minimum of
due process required in parole revocation proceedings: written notice of the claimed violation
of parole; disclosure of evidence against the parolee; opportunity to be heard in person and
present witnesses and documentary evidence; right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses; right to decision by an impartial tribunal; and a written statement by the fact-
finder summarizing the evidence upon which the decision was based. Id.
63. 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
64. The current regulations of the Board of Parole require a parole release "hearing" or
interview before a parole decision is made. The interview is informal and rarely lasts more
than 10 to 15 minutes. Though the present regulations permit the inmate to be represented
by counsel, the Board's administrative law judge may arbitrarily restrict the role of counsel,
and few prisoners are in fact represented by counsel at interviews. In addition, prisoners are
never given access to the institutional file upon which the parole decision is usually based.
39 Fed. Reg. 20029 (1974); Johnson, supra note 31, at 468-69. A description of a parole
interview from the prisoner's perspective may be found in Scarpa v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 468 F.2d 31, 34-35 (5th Cir. 1972).
65. Named as defendants were the Chairman of the United States Board of Parole, the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the Attorney General of the United States, and the United
States.
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of his application for parole violated the due process clause66 and
section 555(e) of the APA.67 The federal district court accepted de-
fendants' argument that the administration of parole was commit-
ted to the unreviewable discretion of the Board, and dismissed the
action. 8 The Seventh Circuit pointed out, however, that even if the
Board's discretionary actions were unrevieWable, the courts still had
jurisdiction to determine whether the Board had contravened a sep-
arate statutory command that it state reasons for a discretionary
decision." Moreover, although the court declined to rest its decision
on due process grounds because of the alternative ground of disposi-
tion available under the APA, it discussed the constitutional ques-
tion at unusual length,70 and concluded that, in view of Morrissey,
a "substantial" due process argument now exists for requiring a
statement of reasons for denial of parole.7'
Turning to the statutory issue, the court reviewed the 1972
66. Note 4 supra.
67. Note 32 supra.
68. King v. United States, No. TH-C-126 (S.D. Ind. 1973). The order of dismissal and
memorandum opinion by Noland, J., was not reported, and the present summary of the trial
dismissal relies on the synopsis in the appellate opinion. The dismissal was predicated upon
the rationale of Brest v. Ciccone, 371 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1967), which held that the Parole
Board's exercise of discretion under 18 U.S.C. 4203(a) is not judicially reviewable. See notes
40-41 supra and accompanying text.
69. Cf. Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (federal prisoner may obtain
review of alleged violation of constitutional rights by Board in declaratory judgment proceed-
ing). See Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency
Discretion, " 82 HARv. L. REv. 367, 369-70 (1968).
70. The Seventh Circuit apparently relied in King on the principle articulated by Jus-
tice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA that a constitutional question will not be decided if it
may be avoided by a "fair construction of statute." 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). Although the King court's extensive discussion of due process rights in parole
proceedings is dictum, the length of the discussion gives it significance when compared to
the terse treatment usually given to undecided constitutional issues by appellate courts. See,
e.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 338 (1955). Another factor lending importance to the due
process analysis in King is that the Seventh Circuit had previously construed Morrissey to
indicate that "[a] residuum of constitutionally protected rights" remains after criminal
conviction. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973). Review-
ing the post-conviction trend in current due process law in King, the court noted that the
right-privilege distinction "has ceased being a touchstone" for the applicability of due pro-
cess, and that the Morrissey and Miller decisions had recognized due process rights at points
before and after the parole release hearing-parole revocation proceedings in Morrissey;
prison disciplinary proceedings in Miller. The court apparently concluded that in view of
Morrissey and Miller the rationale of Menechino v. Oswald, see notes 50-53 supra and accom-
panying text, was no longer persuasive, and that a "substantial argument" can now be made
that at least minimal due process should attend parole denials. The court's discussion would
seem to indicate that if the statutory ground of disposition had not been available, the court
would have recognized the due process right to a statement of reasons for parole denial,
though this position of course cannot be ascertained. 492 F.2d at 1342-43.
71. Id.
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recommendations of the Federal Administrative Conference 2 and
found that the current trend was toward greater procedural safe-
guards in parole release hearings. The court observed, nevertheless,
that a statutory mandate for a requirement of reasons was necessary
before plaintiff could succeed. Examining the definitional provi-
sions of the APA, the court then concluded that the Board of Parole
was a governmental agency within the purview of the Act.7 3 An
analysis of earlier decisions holding portions of the APA inapplica-
ble to the Board's proceedings persuaded the court that the holdings
of Hyser 4 and Hiatt" extended no further than precluding the appl-
icability of the adjudication and judicial review portions of the
Act.7" Recognizing that the relationship of section 555(e) to parole
release decisions therefore posed a question of first impression, the
court looked to the language of the statute and the congressional
intent behind it to ascertain the extent of its coverage. The express
terms of section 555(e) required any agency that denied a written
application made "in connection with any agency proceeding" to
provide a brief statement of the ground for denial. Finding that the
federal parole proceedings are initiated by a written application
from the prisoner,7  the court then reached the controlling issue:
whether a parole release hearing or interview is an "agency proceed-
ing" within the scope of section 555(e). The court determined that,
in light of the legislative purpose for its inclusion in the APA, sec-
tion 555(e) should apply to all types of agency decision processes,
whether formal or informal and whether or not based upon a "hear-
ing." Since the parole release interview was an integral part of the
Board's procedure in reaching final disposition of a parole applica-
tion,79 the court concluded that the hearing fell within the scope of
section 555(e) and that the Board therefore was required to provide
the affected _prisoner with a short written statement of the reasons
for denial of his parole application."
72. See material cited note 35 supra.
73. See notes 11 & 22 supra and accompanying text.
74. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
75. Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949).
76. See notes 22-28 supra and accompanying text.
77. See note 31 supra.
78. See note 64 supra.
79. Id.
80. The court expressed concern that the requirement of providing a statement of
reasons should not become a burden on the Board's decision process that would delay delivery
of parole decisions, and directed the district court to retain jurisdiction over the timing of
the delivery of the statement so that communication of the decision itself to inmates would
not be impeded. 492 F.2d at 1345 n.27. The court's interest in the administrative practicality
of the newly imposed requirement may have been prompted by a recent commentator's
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B. The Applicability of Due Process-Scarpa v. United States
Board of Parole and United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York
Board of Parole
In 1973, a divided Fifth Circuit concluded in Scarpa v. United
States Board of Parole8' that due process does not attach to parole
release proceedings because a prisoner who seeks parole has no pres-
ently enjoyed right that may be injured in a parole release proceed-
ing, but merely a "possibility of conditional freedom."8, Scarpa al-
leged that the Board had denied a fair hearing to him by placing
undue emphasis on his past criminal record in denying his parole
application. He contended that the Board could not act in a manner
completely lacking in due process, and that the courts should not
insulate the Board from responding to charges of abuse of discretion.
On first hearing the majority held that the precedents for applying
due process safeguards to parole revocation proceedings were persu-
asive authority for the conclusion that "at least something other
than an absolute unbridled exercise of discretion by the Board" is
required in parole release proceedings. 3 Judge Gewin dissented8'
vigorously, however, arguing that parole was a privilege, not a right,
and that therefore parole matters were not subject to judicial re-
view, and that recognizing due process rights in parole release pro-
ceedings would inundate the courts with prisoner lawsuits. On
rehearing en banc,8 Judge Gewin's majority opinion reversed the
first decision, but articulated different grounds from those in his
dissent. Though the en banc majority did not cite Menechino v.
Oswald87 as authority for its reasoning, it relied on factors similar
to the grounds of the Menechino decision in holding that no due
process applies to parole release proceedings.8 The majority noted,
first, that due process applies only in proceedings that may affect a
observation about the need for a balanced approach to reform of parole procedures:
[T]he likely practical consequences of any procedural reform ought to be kept squarely
in mind. The United States Board of Parole presently conducts approximately 12,000
hearings per year, and it is of the highest importance that it make well-considered
decisions very promptly. Any "reform" that distracted the Board from this primary
responsibility would be a step in the wrong direction.
Johnson, supra note 32, at 460.
81. 468 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 477 F.2d 280 (en bane), cert. granted, vacated
and remanded for consideration of mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
82. 477 F.2d at 282.
83. 468 F.2d at 37.
84. 468 F.2d at 39.
85. Id. Contra, note 40 supra.
86. 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane). The en bane opinion was delivered after the
Supreme Court had announced the Morrissey decision.
87. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
88. Id.
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presently enjoyed right,89 and secondly, that parole proceedings are
not adversary in character." Reasoning that no due process is neces-
sary until after the government confers a benefit such as parole
release, the en banc opinion stated that "[i]f the Board refuses to
grant parole, Scarpa has suffered no deprivations."'" Judge Tuttle's
cogent dissent 2 suggested that the majority had misconstrued
Morrissey by directing its analysis toward the existence of a present
benefit, rather than looking to whether denial of parole inflicted
"grievous loss" on a prisoner. He further observed that Morrissey
supported the holding of the first hearing that arbitrary and unfair
procedures of the board of parole are generally subject to court
review on due process grounds, arguing that the basic language of
Morrissey was equally applicable to both parole revocation and pa-
role release. 3
In United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York Board of Parole,"
the Second Circuit distinguished its holding in Menechino v.
Oswald 5 and held that due process entitles a prisoner in the state
correctional system to a written statement Qf reasons for the denial
of his parole application. The opinion of the federal district court
in Johnson95 had refused to follow Menechino or Scarpa and had
89. Compare Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1970) with Scarpa v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 1973).
90. Id.
91. 477 F.2d at 282.
92. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1973) (Tuttle, J.,
dissenting).
93. Id. at 287.
94. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
95. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).
96. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York Bd. of Parole, 363 F. Supp. 416
(E.D.N.Y. 1973). A number of federal district courts have recognized a due process right to a
statement of reasons for denial of parole within the past two years. Application of Candarini,
369 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (federal parole proceedings); Childs v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1973) (federal parole proceedings); United States ex rel.
Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (federal parole proceedings); Johnson v.
Heggie, 362 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1973) (dictum) (state parole proceedings). Only one federal
district court has refused to recognize the due process right to a statement of reasons. Barra-
dale v. United States Bd. of Parole, 362 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (rationale analogous
to Menechino v. Oswald). The decision in Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, supra,
contains the most sweeping language of any of the district court opinions except Johnson,
stating that "it seems fair to say that the slate [with regard to the parole system] has been
all but wiped clean by Morrissey v. Brewer." 371 F. Supp. at 1247. The Childs court found
numerous areas of potential abuse in current parole administration, including practices al-
lowing filing errors and omissions, cases of confusion in parole decisions stemming from
instances of mistaken identity, possible reliance on outdated and superseded information,
reliance on unsubstantiated assertions, and reliance on conflicting and in some cases not
apparently reliable psychological testing data and information. 371 F. Supp. at 1248. The
relief granted in Childs also went beyond that yet decreed by any federal or state court. The
court found that due process in parole proceedings requires that the Board give narrative
written statements of reasons for denial of parole, based upon the salient characteristics of
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recognized a due process right to a statement of reasons, holding
that a prisoner has a legally cognizable "right" to parole when there
is a substantial correlation between his situation and the terms of
the state parole statute. 7 While the Second Circuit majority did not
adopt this novel position" that a prisoner may have a "right" to
parole, the appellate opinion distinguished Menechino on two
grounds. First, petitioners in Menechino had been interested princi-
pally in obtaining the right to be represented by counsel and the
right to cross-examination in parole release hearings, and the
Menechino court had not considered the question of granting partial
relief in the form of a right to a statement of reasons for parole
denial. Secondly, the Johnson court felt that Morrissey cast "grave
doubt" upon the validity of Menechino because of the unequivocal
rejection in Morrissey of the right-privilege distinction; the court
recognized that the Menechino requirement that a right must be
presently enjoyed before meriting due process safeguards was "noth-
ing more than a reincarnation of the right-privilege dichotomy in a
not-too-deceptive disguise." 9 The court did not overrule
each case; that the Board revise its regulations to allow prisoners a right of access and reply
to the information upon which the parole decision is based; and that the Board distribute
explanatory material to prisoners to guide them in understanding the factors upon which the
Board relies in reaching parole decisions. 371 F. Supp. at 1248. In this context, see also
Freeman v. Schoen, 370 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Minn. 1974) (denial of opportunity for parole to
qualified prisoner because of nature of crime is abuse of discretion).
97. 363 F. Supp. at 418.
98. No other reported opinion has adopted the position that a prisoner has a legal
"right" to parole when a substantial correlation exists between the prisoner's situation and
the terms of the parole statute, though the decision in Freeman v. Schoen, 370 F. Supp. 1144
(D. Minn. 1974), could be read to support the theory. In Freeman, a prisoner who was eligible
for release was refused an opportunity for parole by the state board because of the highly
publicized nature of the crimes he had committed, the possibility that his release would foster
adverse community sentiment, and the nature of the crimes he had committed (grand theft).
The court found that if the prisoner were denied an opportunity for parole in the first in-
stance, he would never be eligible for parole release again under the community work-
detention program sponsored by the state correctional system. The court reasoned that de-
priving the prisoner of his only chance for parole for the stated reasons, when he was otherwise
qualified, constituted a "grievous loss" within the purview of the Morrissey v. Brewer holding,
and that the refusal to grant parole to the prisoner was therefore an abuse of discretion.
Though the district court opinions in Johnson and Freeman are in accord with the weight
of authority in recognizing that due process rights exist in parole proceedings, see note 96
supra, the proposition that a prisoner can have a "right" to parole would seem contrary to
the analysis used in Morrissey, which was directed toward evaluating the practical effect of
parole revocation rather than abstractly classifying the legal interests involved. Moreover,
asserting that a right to parole exists seems to resurrect the terms of the right-privilege
doctrine, see notes 39-46 supra and accompanying text, and the Supreme Court has rejected
that doctrine by name. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
99. 500 F.2d at 928. Compare this language with the analysis of Menechino v. Oswald
in Comment, The Parole Process, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 361-63 (1971). See note 50 supra.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Menechino, however, observing that it had established the valid
principle that an inmate being considered for parole was not enti-
tled to a full array of due process rights. Having distinguished
Menechino, the court applied a three-step analysis similar to that
used in Morrissey."' It initially noted that the difference between
incarceration and parole release meant that the prisoner had an
enormous interest at stake in the parole release proceeding. Turning
to an evaluation of the governmental aspect, the court characterized
the board of parole as "an extraordinarily powerful administrative
body, possessing vast discretionary authority.""1 ' and stressed that
the board had failed to publish any criteria that would assure re-
sponsible exercise of its discretion. The court concluded that a bal-
ancing of these factors indicated that "some degree" of due process
attached to parole release hearings, extending at least to a state-
ment of reasons for denial of parole in view of the minimal burden
that the requirement of reasons would impose on the board's admin-
istrative machinery.0 2 In its discussion of the policies supporting a
statement of reasons, the court dwelled at length on the importance
of judicial review of parole proceedings, noting three instances in
which review could correct an abuse of discretion in parole deci-
sion-when the decision was inconsistent with statutory directives,
based on improper criteria, or not supported by evidence in the
prisoner's file. The court further observed that a requirement of
written reasons promoted more thorough analysis by a decision-
maker, and gave the affected prisoner an opportunity to improve his
record and better his chances for parole. The court concluded that
a final benefit of the requirement might be the creation of a body
of written precedents, which could serve the threefold purpose of
promoting consistency in board decisions, providing a basis for criti-
cal appraisal of the board's efficacy, and assisting courts in a just
exercise of their sentencing powers.
IV. CRiTIQUE-DuE PROCESS AND STATUTORY RIGHTS IN PAROLE
RELEASE PROCEEDINGS
A. Inadequacy of the Federal APA
By holding in King v. United States that the United States
100. Notes 57-63 supra and accompanying text.
101. 500 F.2d at 929.
102. The court reasoned that the administrative burden would be small because of two
factors: first, the assumption that parole is granted in a majority of cases and that statements
of reasons would be required only in a minority of cases; secondly, the failure of the state
board of parole to make any attempt to show that the requirement would impose a significant
burden on the state. But see material quoted note 80 supra.
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Board of Parole is subject to section 555(e) of the APA, and must
give a written statement of reasons for denial of a parole application,
the Seventh Circuit reached a result consonant with the positions
of the commentators 0 3 and apparently with that of the Board it-
self.'4 As the Second Circuit indicated in Johnson, the requirement
of a statement of reasons discourages arbitrary decisions by assuring
that proper factors were considered in arriving at the decision, and
provides a record from which prisoners may seek judicial review of
denials made on improper grounds.' 5 Nevertheless, the straightfor-
ward ease with which the King court found the Board subject to
section 555(e) raises the question why this position could not have
been reached much earlier in the history of the APA. Though the
increasing number of state and federal decisions recognizing post-
conviction rights may have provided a necessary milieu for the hold-
ing, a review of Hiatt'5 and Hyser °7 suggests that the courts pre-
viously have relied upon an unarticulated premise that the Board's
functions and the scheme of the APA are disjoint-the APA, de-
signed to systematize the proceedings of agencies that regulate and
administer to free citizens, was apparently deemed unsuitable to
apply to the activities of the Board, which exercises a custodial,
discretionary power over a captive population. As a perceptive com-
mentator' °8 has remarked, the premise that administrative action is
committed to agency discretion and is unreviewable usually derives
from the judicial conclusion that "on practical and policy grounds
an agency determination should not be subject to direct review.""0 9
In the Board's case, such practical and policy grounds include the
fear that applying the APA would put an impossible burden on its
administrative machinery,"' the belief that the Board's decisions
103. See note 31 supra.
104. The Board recently has completed a revision of its regulations, providing inter alia
for a statement of reasons for parole denial, more specific criteria for parole release, and a
prisoner's right to be represented by counsel and present evidence. 39 Fed. Reg. 20029, 23261
(1974). As of September, 1974, however, these regulations were effective only in the Board's
Northeast, South Central and Western regions. Id. At least one federal district court has
taken a skeptical attitude toward the constitutional adequacy of the new regulations with
regard to the statement of reasons for denial, stating that the decision on the sufficiency of
the statement of reasons should be postponed until the Board's revision of its regulations had
progressed beyond the stage of a pilot program, and encouraging the Board to provide better
statements. Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925 (D. Conn. 1973).
105. 500 F.2d at 931-33.
106. Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949).
107. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
108. Saferstein, supra note 69 at 368.
109. Id.
110. Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir. 1949).
19741
1272 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
are based on unique expertise and administrative perspective,"' and
the judicial desire to avoid a deluge of prisoner requests for review
of parole decisions.11 2 Notwithstanding the undeniable need for im-
provement of Board procedures,"' an examination of the potential
results of King v. United States suggests that the variance between
the Board's functions and the framework of the APA, so long
unquestioned by the courts, should remain a relevant factor in re-
form efforts. For example, section 555(b) of the APA (right to re-
tained counsel in agency proceedings)'" and parts of section 552 (the
"Freedom of Information" Act)" ' seem equally applicable to the
Board under the King analysis. Moreover, applying each section to
parole release proceedings would seem to continue the trend of in-
creased procedural protection of prisoner interests by subjecting the
Board's actions to adversary examination and judicial inspection."
Yet, in some circumstances, these sections and section 555(e) could
deprive the Board of desirable administrative flexibility and could
further burden the administrative machinery through which it an-
nually must reach thousands of parole decisions of critical import-
ance. The Board may have valid reasons for withholding a state-
ment of reasons for denial of parole,"7 but section 555(e) leaves no
111. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
112. Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 46 (5th Cir. 1949).
113. There are no defenders of the parole system among current commentators. See,
e.g., Johnson, supra note 31, at 469-70; DAVIS, supra note 31; Kastenmeier and Eglit, supra
note 3, at 483-84; Parsons-Lewis, supra note 46, at 1520.
114. Administrative Procedure Act § 6(a), 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970) provides that when
a person is "compelled to appear" before an agency or its representative he is entitled to be
accompanied by counsel. Though the relevance of the section may seem problematic in view
of the recent revision of Board regulations allowing counsel to be present at parole hearings,
see note 104 supra, a separate statutory right would not be entirely moot since the Board's
new regulations are not effective in all federal prisons. Additionally, recognition of a statutory
right could prevent the interest of a prisoner in being represented by counsel from being
eliminated by administrative fiat. The premise for applicability of section 555(b) derives from
the language of the current regulations that when a prisoner has applied for parole he "shall"
appear before the Board's administrative law judge for a hearing. The mandatory language
of the regulation would seem to satisfy the statutory requisite that a party be under compul-
sion to appear. 39 Fed. Reg. 20029-30 (1974). But see Johnson, supra note 31, at 481.
115. Administrative Procedure Act § 3(b)-(c), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2), (4) (1970), require
each agency subject to the Act to make available for public inspection, inter alia, a record of
decisions made by the agency and statements of policy and interpretations made by the
agency but not published in the Federal Register. Another requirement is a public record of
votes cast by each member of the agency in agency proceedings; in the context of the Board,
this provision apparently would require a record not only of parole decisions made by admin-
istrative law judges, but of the agency review within the Board of parole decisions. 39 Fed.
Reg. 20029, 20030 (1974).
116. Cf. King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1974) (administrative
trend toward greater procedural safeguards in parole proceedings).
117. For example, it may be desirable to withhold disclosure of reasons when parole is
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discretion for doing so. Recognition of a statutory right to counsel
in parole hearings, or to public examination of Board files, could
slow drastically both the decision process and the delivery of deci-
sions to prisoners, engaging the Board in constant litigation over
discovery of its files and diverting personnel from decision-making.
Though the goal of making the Board's procedures more open to
prophylactic public and judicial scrutiny is commendable and
timely, the APA may thus prove to be only a speciously attractive
means to the end. The critical position of the Board in the area of
correctional penology calls for a finer balance among the interests
of prisoner rehabilitation, the safety of the general public, and ad-
ministrative efficiency. New legislation, tailored to the unique as-
pects of the Board's function, may be the most promising course."'
Alternatively, the courts may find a more apposite vehicle for the
protection of prisoner and public interests in the procedural applica-
tion of the flexible due process doctrine."'
B. Suggested Role of Due Process in Parole Release Proceedings
The recognition in United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York
Board of Parole that a degree of due process attaches to parole
release proceedings fills a significant hiatus in the range of post-
conviction rights.' 2 Because it is based on constitutional rather than
statutory grounds, the Johnson decision will probably have a broad
impact on other state parole boards, since few had adopted the
practice of giving reasons for parole denials as of 1973.121 Under the
authority of Scarpa, however, no due process is yet recognized in
federal parole release proceedings, though the due process question,
with regard to requiring a statement of reasons, may be rendered
denied on psychiatric grounds, if disclosure would be harmful to the applicant. See Monks
v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 247-48, 277 A.2d 193, 197-98 (1971).
118. Increasing congressional attention has been directed toward parole reform in re-
cent years; several major bills to overhaul the parole system have been introduced in recent
terms of Congress, though none have been adopted. See Kastenmeier and Eglit, supra note
3, at 480 & n.13.
119. Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 49, at 1454: "[A] right to procedural due process is
desirable; a hearing can expose to public view arbitrary or inequitable grounds for a decision,
thus facilitating a political remedy even where no legal remedy is available, and may serve
to establish the channels for an individual to present his viewpoint to otherwise inaccessible
administrators." It should be noted, however, that the availability of the APA as a ground of
decision may limit recognition of due process rights by federal courts. Cf. notes 70, 114-15
supra.
120. See notes 51, 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
121. As of 1973 there were 40 state parole boards that did not state reasons for denial
of parole applications; 26 did not even inform the inmate directly of the decision to deny his
application. Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 3, at 481-82.
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moot at the present time by the King decision and the Board's
recently revised regulations.' 2 The questions nonetheless remain
whether the split between the Scarpa and Johnson holdings may be
reconciled, and if not, which rationale should prevail, since due
process requirements other than written reasons may be germane to
parole release proceedings.'2 3 A review of the analysis used in
Scarpa2 14 suggests that the Fifth Circuit majority relied on virtually
the same factors previously set out in Menechino v. Oswald'2 by the
Second Circuit to conclude that no due process obtained in parole
release proceedings. As in Menechino, the Scarpa court emphasized
that a prisoner has no cognizable due process right unless he is
presently enjoying some governmental benefit; as in Menechino, the
Scarpa court stressed that even if a right existed, parole proceedings
would not threaten it because they are nonadversary in character.'1
In view of the Second Circuit's apparent repudiation in Johnson of
the Menechino rationale, 2 1 if not the result, the only possible
ground of reconciliation between Scarpa and Johnson may be that
Scarpa, like Menechino, holds that the "full panoply" of due pro-
cess rights does not apply to parole release proceedings. None of the
opinions in Scarpa indicate that the Fifth Circuit considered the
question of limited relief in the form of a requirement of reasons for
the parole decision, and the Johnson court distinguished Menechino
on this ground. 28 Since at least one other circuit' 2 has found Scarpa
persuasive on the collateral issue of the discretionary character of
the Board's duties,'30 however, a choice between the Scarpa and
Johnson approaches to judicial treatment of parole procedures
seems inevitable. From this perspective, Johnson appears to be
more consistent analytically with the policies relied on in Morrissey,
which pointed first, toward a realistic evaluation of the impact of
122. See 104 supra.
123. See Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 371 F. Supp. 1246 (D.D.C. 1973) (mini-
mum due process in parole proceeding includes fully reasoned decision, right of access to
information upon which decision is based, and published criteria for decision).
124. See notes 88-91 supra and accompanying text.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.
1974).
128. Id.
129. United States Bd. of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1973), held that
inmates in juvenile correctional institutes may not obtain discovery of Board files and other
information about its performance of statutory duties. The Fourth Circuit noted specifically
that the Supreme Court's disposition of Scarpa (the Court granted certiorari, vacated the
decree and remanded the case for a consideration of mootness, 414 U.S. 809 (1973)) did not




an adverse parole decision on the prisoner, and secondly, toward
recognition of the social interest in avoiding inaccurate decisions in
parole proceedings. 3' The Johnson court discarded the distinction
based on whether a right is presently enjoyed, relied on in
Menechino and Scarpa, as a throwback to the now rejected right-
privilege doctrine; this renunciation would seem the more persua-
sive since both Menechino and Johnson were decided by the same
circuit.1 2 The conclusion in Johnson that a prisoner, irrespective of
whether his right is "presently enjoyed," has an interest at stake in
parole proceedings that merits due process protection because of the
difference between continued incarceration and parole release
seems appropriate both in light of Morrissey113 and common sense. 34
Finally, the thorough appraisal in Johnson of the need to structure
the discretionary powers of parole boards, leading to the conclusion
that the government itself has an interest in improving parole proce-
dures, is in accord with Morrissey'35 and the weight of scholarly
authority. 31
In view of the Johnson holding that "some degree" of due pro-
cess attaches to parole release proceedings, the question arises
whether safeguards in addition to a written statement of reasons
may be appropriate. Future litigation in this area seems certain to
include the adequacy of the written statement of reasons-how brief
may a statement be and still satisfy the due process minimum?1 3
The Johnson opinion discussed ten separate policy justifications for
a reasons requirement,'38 including, inter alia ,facilitation of judicial
131. See notes 57-62 and accompanying text supra.
132. In addition, both the Menechino and Johnson opinions were written by Judge
Mansfield. United States ex rel. Johnson v. New York Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.
1974); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).
133. Cf. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1973) (dis-
senting opinion); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 415 (2d Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion).
134. See Parsons-Lewis, supra note 46, at 1540.
135. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
136. Materials cited note 113 supra.
137. This issue was litigated, though not decided, with regard to the current Board
regulations in Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 930-31 (D. Conn. 1973). The prisoner
involved in Battle had received the explanation that his parole application had been denied
because his release would "depreciate the seriousness of the offense." Id. at 926. The court
took notice of the experimental status of the Board's program of stating reasons for denial of
parole, and declined to evaluate the adequacy of the statement while the program was still
in the pilot stage. Though the court denied any relief to the prisoner, it strongly encouraged
the Board to continue improving its procedures. Id. at 932. But see Application of Wilkerson,
371 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (cursory statement of reasons permissible in context of
institutional file).
138. The policy justifications articulated by the Johnson court are: (1) the statement
of reasons provides a basis for judicial review; (2) the statement protects against arbitrary
and capricious decision-making; (3) the statement discloses the grounds upon which the
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review, of thoughtful decision-making and of prisoner rehabilita-
tion. Few of these goals would seem served by a statement to a
prisoner such as, "Your release at this time would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense.' 1 39 A more appropriate result may be
judicial extension of the reasons requirement into a fully reasoned
decision from the Board's administrative law judge. Requiring a
reasoned decision would promote the development of a "body of
rules, principles and precedent"'' that would provide guidance for
recurring parole situations14' while informing the bench and the
public of the criteria actually 'employed by the Board in reaching
parole decisions.' 42 The Johnson decision therefore establishes a
basis for future judicial action that could upgrade significantly the
quality of the Board's decision-making. The majority opinion in
Morrissey suggests another due process right that could contribute
to the same result-the disclosure to the prisoner of adverse infor-
mation in the file upon which the decision will be made.' 43 The
majority in Morrissey stressed that the need exists to provide the
parole decision-maker with an accurate knowledge of the facts rele-
vant to the proceeding;' 44 that rationale would seem equally applica-
ble to parole release decisions.' 45 Disclosing adverse information to
a prisoner may thus contribute to better parole decisions by allow-
ing an opportunity to rebut untrue or misleading information while
contributing to the prisoner's rehabilitation by providing a fully
disclosed factual basis for adverse decisions. 4
Questions of due process in parole proceedings should not, how-
ever, be decided without an awareness of their administrative im-
decision was made, informing the public; (4) the statement discourages decisions that are
legislative in nature, are inconsistent with statutory directives, are based on improper cri-
teria, or have no basis in the prisoner's file; (5) the statement promotes a more thoroughly
reasoned decision; (6) the statement relieves prisoner frustrations by letting them know how
they might more successfully attempt to obtain parole; (7) the statement could encourage
the board of parole to develop a body of "rules, principles, and precedents" that would
promote consistency in decisions; (8) the statement would provide a basis for critical ap-
praisal of parole policies by experts in the area; (9) the statement could serve as a guide to
trial courts in the exercise of their sentencing discretion by indicating the probability of parole
in particular cases; (10) the statement poses no significant burden on the administrative
machinery of the board of parole. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974).
139. See note 138 supra.




143. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
144. Id. at 484.
145. Cf. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 287 (5th Cir. 1973) (dis-
senting opinion).
146. Cf. Johnson, supra note 31, at 469.
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pact.4 7 The Board of Parole makes more than 12,000 decisions an-
nually "8 and the imposition of due process rights that could over-
burden the Board's administrative machinery may prove counter-
productive by resulting in serious delays in delivery of parole deci-
sions. "' For this reason the recognition of mandatory rights to coun-
sel, confrontation and cross-examination, compulsory attendance of
witnesses, or complete discovery of Board files would seem prob-
lematic in light of the administrative burdens they could impose.
The advantage of due process analysis in this sensitive area, in
contrast to proceedings under the APA, is that the flexible applica-
tion of due process exemplified in Morrissey offers a more appro-
priate method of balancing the interests of the prisoner, the govern-
ment, and the general public in reaching prompt and correct parole
decisions through more efficient use of the existing administrative
framework.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have established that
due process attaches to some post-conviction proceedings, but have
not considered whether prisoner interests in parole release proceed-
ings merit due process safeguards. In view of the leading decision
in Morrissey v. Brewer, the split among federal circuits on the issue
of due process in parole release should be resolved by recognizing
that limited due process rights apply in release proceedings. The
more pressing issue of which safeguards should be allowed remains
to be solved, however, by an appropriate balance of the prisoner,
public and governmental interests-the degree to which a particular
due process right may improve the decision-making process, against
the extent to which it burdens and slows the Board's functioning.
This Comment has suggested that the availability of this balancing
procedure renders due process analysis superior to the APA as a
means of reforming parole administration, and has suggested lim-
ited due process rights that promise to improve the quality of parole
release decisions.
JAMES DERRELL HOLLAND
147. Materials quoted note 80 supra.
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149. See generally Johnson, supra note 31, at 469-70.
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